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
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BRIEFING

WHAT'S WRONG WITH
U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The problems that plague the intelligence community are so deeply rooted that only fundamental changes can improve performance



BY STALANE GOODMAN

The recent campaign for the White House marked the latest attempt to force the intelligence community to work the American intelligence community's performance was a failure.

From last January it is clear that President Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski all left off their thinking intelligence had not served their need.

Moreover, over these the decade in Iran the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence have been sharply critical of the intelligence briefing they have received from the intelligence agencies.

The fragmented, disorganized collection of intelligence have actually impeded the sharing of information. And rival agencies in full competition for financing prepare such divergent analyses that the system fails to provide enough of value, timely, or complete information to policy makers.

Unfortunately, such problems have plagued the intelligence community for more than a decade and are so deeply rooted that only fundamental changes in the system will improve performance.

Intelligence Failures

The quality of intelligence provided by the community has been seriously questioned for some time. There have been at least 20 alleged intelligence failures (documented by Congress or the press) since 1980.

These failures include the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet invasion of Cuba in 1979. Such intelligence failures have all been extremely costly to U.S. security. Some of these failures led to major crises, like the Cuban missile crisis, others, such as the underestimation of the Soviet nuclear buildup, led to non-optimal policy decisions about America's arms arsenal and the need to modernize it.

U.S. intelligence agencies have failed to anticipate military actions and to identify Soviet and Soviet allies with the Soviet power community has rarely provided correctly the use of force by one state to achieve its aims over another.

Their failures include the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950, the raid to the USS

Liberty of Israel in 1967. If the ship contained a nuclear weapon, the raid to the USS Pueblo of its surveillance activities near North Korea in 1968, the 1972 Arab-Israeli war, the Argentine seizure of the Falkland Islands (Gulf War), and the subsequent British sailing of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, and the efforts by Iran and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons and support facilities since the Persian Gulf war broke out.

In each of these cases, misperceived or mistaken policy also was at fault. But to blame the policy-maker for the failure in many intelligence professionals have done, would be a serious mistake.

However, the policy-makers

received their conclusions, they were passed by faulty intelligence analysis or poorly served by the slow or incomplete dissemination of reports by the intelligence community.

The Iran Problem

The most badly documented intelligence failure of the 1970s was the Iran problem. Actually, a series of failures along with a conflicting policy toward the state led to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 and destroyed vital American economic and security interests in the region.

To be sure, in the circumstances who compiled the CIA's post-mortem on Iran's later discovery, set a major portion to or out of power, most forecast the success of Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolution have

varied from predicted correctly, but U.S. intelligence agencies and their analysts failed even to sense Iran.

The episode marked Jimmy Carter to end the international system and to the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Brzezinski, and then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

"To Cy, Dick, Stan—I am not satisfied with the quality of the intelligence community, from our own side, as well as from the other side, in the past several years, we should do to improve our ability to give us personal information and advice."

At the same level, now prior.

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As early as 1982, the House Select Committee on Intelligence was underwhelmed by CIA's report, the country's most important and requested source of military intelligence officer and deputy director of central intelligence said 1982.

James told several officials that the U.S. intelligence community's performance was at its lowest level since Pearl Harbor.

And in the wake of the worst case of Soviet espionage in the U.S. during the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed concern about "the state of our intelligence" and "the need for a more professional approach."

Larry Sanders blamed it on "a declining trend of a decline in resources that resulted in inadequate funding and support for intelligence-gathering activities."

Intelligence and foreign-policy professionals should take such criticism seriously, despite the political circumstances and realize that they have performed it.

Many intelligence operations have left the profession wondering if the community has become

Since the White House has not permitted the director of central intelligence to release its unclassified version of the CIA's report, the number of personnel in the State and therefore it is impossible to complete a track record.

But it is not surprising that the failure of the present as that of the past. In the past, the failure of the present as that of the past. In the past, the failure of the present as that of the past.

American intelligence has frequently outperformed Soviet behavior and capabilities—targets of highest priority. U.S. intelligence has been able to identify the Soviet threat to American U.S. intelligence in 1982.

It failed to predict Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962. But subsequent to Khrushchev, Soviet behavior and capabilities—targets of highest priority. U.S. intelligence has been able to identify the Soviet threat to American U.S. intelligence in 1982.

The intelligence community

When Pressure
Forces a CIA Officer to Quit

BY JOHN HORTON

In my 10 years as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, I have seen the pressure put on me by the director of central intelligence—William Casey—to come up with a National Intelligence Estimate on Mexico that would satisfy him.

This is not the first time that pressure has been put on me by the director of central intelligence to come up with what their superiors consider to be the right answer.

A previous director not long ago remarked that he was roundly a "fucker" because he had told the Soviet Union that we were being untruthful under a structure were not passing to the policy-makers at the time—the only one didn't say that our policy in Vietnam was wrong.

In my own case, it was not that the policy-makers were putting pressure on the director, but rather that the pressure was on me and others working in the Mexico

office came from the director himself.

Nothing will get an intelligence officer's back up faster than a staff of that kind of pressure to meet a deadline. It is a matter of principle, but it is also a matter of judgment to make them more plausible to be reporters or to answer the story of approval on an administration's policies.

A National Intelligence Estimate is not merely an intelligence report or a list of analysis, nor should it be any one man's opinion. It is the product of the deliberation of representatives of all the intelligence agencies and staffs dealing with foreign affairs.

As a member of the National Intelligence Council, the national intelligence officer chairs the writing of the estimate. This may give him more influence than any of the representatives from CIA, State or Army or Navy or Air Force or the Marine, or from the Defense Intelligence Agency. It may not.

But the final should reflect the views of all the agencies and differences in their views. It is not or should not be blindly accepted or a document. A lack of pressure may make an arrogant. The natural tension will continue.

If we accept that as inevitable, our staff should be to reflect the tension. I propose that we do so through a more informal council of officers—a trial council—to act as the public conscience, more intelligence matters should be reviewed or discussed. A lack of pressure may make an arrogant. The natural tension will continue.

What has long held—and has not been met—has been the pressure of policy-makers. This council would act with the director, who is in charge of the policy-makers, but he would have no veto power. The council would act with the director, who is in charge of the policy-makers, but he would have no veto power.

But I can be expected to be the future.

Strong-minded officials often think they know better than intelligence officers. Attempts to suppress intelligence reports or judgments that don't back up an administration's policies have a long history in the intelligence community.

William Casey, the current director of central intelligence, is that he is a part of the policy-making group where Central America is involved as much as he is the president's chief intelligence officer. His particular case has led to a lack of support for the collection of future directors from the current services to prevent past criticism being put in the job.

That they appear to be intelligence officers who have an unimpeachable record for our own view, but no intelligence can ensure that a director, as a matter of fact, in our work, will not succumb under pressure.

We should face the expectation that even most of good will and integrity may be overcome of someone they consider to be wrong or inconvenient. A lack of pressure may make an arrogant. The natural tension will continue.

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The council would be made up of members of the four defense organizations already charged with the task of examining the performance of the intelligence community and of the CIA in particular.

In the CIA there is an Office of the Inspector General that inspect the agency and acts as a policeman for employee compliance. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is made up of private citizens appointed by the president.

Two other organizations charged with oversight of the intelligence community are the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. The informal exchange of information and views among these groups would provide a more informed improvement.

What would begin as a pragmatic approach to supporting the integrity of the intelligence profession would benefit from the participation of officials from State, Defense.

Good intelligence is vital to our security. Our discussion of foreign and defense policy officers government from partisan exaggerations and simplifications. Such a trial council could build bridges over policy claims, defend real differences and increase the area of common ground among us far from our group talking.

John Horton was a CIA intelligence officer from 1968 to 1972 and served on the National Intelligence Council from May 1970 to May 1974.

GREAT DECISIONS '85

Starting Next Week

This year marks the 25th year of the Great Decisions program, a biennial conference by the Foreign Policy Association, held in the last week of the Great Decisions program, which system of eight weekly meetings in consultation throughout America to discuss significant U.S. foreign policy issues.

Starting next week, subject material related to the twenty Great Decisions issue will run in the briefing notes. The subject for discussion this week will be "Disarmament: Can It Be Achieved?"

Great Decisions '85 is sponsored jointly by the World Affairs Council of Northern California in cooperation with the Foreign Policy Association, a non-governmental, non-partisan organization. It is open to all citizens to participate in world affairs.

Participants in Great Decisions will receive their own copy of the briefing materials in the weekly meetings. The below will be distributed and reviewed to members of Congress and its staff.

Discussion groups are still being formed and telephone reservations for the weekly issues are being accepted. For more information on Great Decisions '85, call the National Foreign Policy Council, 222 Madison Avenue, Room 301, N.Y.C. 10017, phone 695-6441.